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reporter who had been hired by a private medical physician to
transcribe an informal administrative meeting for use by the
physician in connection with a disciplinary action is governed by
contract law, and absent a specifically enforceable contract, the
reporter is not obligated to perform the work involved in preparing
the transcript.31 °

XIII. CrvIL RIGHTS
A.

LitigatingDiscriminationOutside Human Rights Act

In the case of Vest v. Boardof Education of County of Nicholas,' Justice
Cleckley opened the door for unlawful discrimination to be remedied by the
education and state employees grievance board:
The West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance
Board does not have authority to determine liability under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, See. 5-11-1, et seq.;
nevertheless, the Grievance Board's authority to provide relief to
employees for "discrimination," "favoritism," and "harassment,"
as those terms are defined in W. Va. Code, 18-29-2 (1992),
includes jurisdiction to remedy discrimination that also would
violate the Human Rights Act."
Justice Cleckley held that "[a] civil action filed under the West Virginia
Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-1, et seq., is not precluded by a prior
grievance decided by the West Virginia Education and State Employees Grievance
' 13
Board arising out of the same facts and circumstances."
B.

PrimaFacieCase of Discrimination
In Hanlon v. Chambers' Justice Cleckley clarified the standard for making
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out aprimafaciecase of discrimination:
Although the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving elements
of the claim of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence,
the showing the plaintiff must make as to the elements of the prima
facie case in order to defeat a motion for summary judgment is de
minimis. In determining whether the plaintiff has met the de
minimis initial burden of showing circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination, the function of the circuit court on a
summary judgment motion is to determine whether the proffered
admissible evidence shows circumstances that would be sufficient
to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a discriminatory motive.
It is not the province of the circuit court itself to decide what
inferences should be drawn. 1 5
The opinion in Hanlon set out the effect of a prima facie case of
discrimination on a motion for summary judgment by a defendant:
In most discrimination cases, once a plaintiff's allegations and
evidence create a prima facie case (showing circumstances that
permit an inference of discrimination on an impermissible bias),
unless the employer comes forward with evidence of a dispositive
nondiscriminatory reason as to which there is no genuine issue and
which no rational trier of fact could reject, the conflict between the
plaintiff's evidence establishing a prima facie case and the
employer's evidence of a nondiscriminatory reason reflects a
question of fact to be resolved by the factfinder after trial.316
C.

ProvingEmployment DisparateTreatment

It was held in Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing Home"'7 that "[u]nless a
comparison employee and a plaintiff share the same disputed characteristics, the
comparison employee cannot be classified as a member of a plaintiffs class for
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purposes of rebutting prima facie evidence of disparate treatment.""1 8 In Barefoot,
Justice Cleckley relaxed the burden on a plaintiff to prove that an employer's
proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its actions was pretextual:
After the employer has articulated a nondiscriminatory justification
for its employment decision, to defeat a motion for a directed
verdict a plaintiff need not show more than the articulated reasons
were implausible and, thus, pretextual. A finding of pretextuality
allows a juror to reject a defendant's proffered reasons for a
challenged employment action and, thus, permits the ultimate
inference of discrimination.319
The opinion in Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc.32 set out several disparate
treatment principles:
In disparate treatment cases under the West Virginia Human Rights
Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9 (1992), proof of pretext can by itself
sustain a conclusion that the defendant engaged in unlawful
discrimination. Therefore, if the plaintiff raised an inference of
discrimination through his or her prima facie case and the
fact-finder disbelieves the defendant's explanation for the adverse
action taken against the plaintiff, the factfinder justifiably may
conclude that the logical explanation for the action was the
unlawful discrimination.32 1
Skaggs then held that
[i]n disparate treatment discrimination cases under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9 (1992), a
plaintiff proves a claim for unlawful discrimination if he or she
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that a forbidden intent
was a motivating factor in an adverse employment action. Liability
will then be imposed on a defendant unless it proves by a
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preponderance of the evidence that the same result would have
occurred even in the absence of the unlawful motive.3"
The opinion in Skaggs concluded,
[i]n disparate treatment discrimination cases under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9 (1992), a
plaintiff can create a triable issue of discrimination animus through
direct or circumstantial evidence. Thus, a plaintiff who can offer
sufficient circumstantial evidence on intentional discrimination
may prevail, just as in any other civil case where the plaintiff meets
his or her burden of proof. The question should not be whether the
evidence was circumstantial or direct, but whether the evidence in
its entirety was strong enough to meet the plaintiff's burden of
proof."2
Justice Cleckley noted in Conradv. ARA Szabo 2 4 that "W. Va. Code §
5-11-9(1) (1992) prohibits any person who is an employer from discriminating
against any 'individual' regarding his or her employment opportunities irrespective
32
of whether the individual is an employee of or seeks work with that employer." 1
Conrad also noted that "[t]he term 'person,' as defined and utilized within the
context of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, includes both employees and
employers. 326
D.

Sexual Harassment

The law on sexual harassment was refined in Hanlon v. Chambers.27 The
opinion started out by holding that "[t]he West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va.
Code 5-11-9(1) (1992), imposes a duty on employers to ensure that workplaces are
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free of sexual harassment from whatever source. 328 Justice Cleckley then ruled
that
[t]o establish a claim for sexual harassment under the West
Virginia Human Rights Act, W.Va. Code, 5-1 1-1, et seq., based
upon a hostile or abusive work environment, a plaintiff-employee
must prove that (1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was
based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of employment and
create an abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on
some factual basis to the employer.329
Hanlon concluded by holding that
[a]n employee may state a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment if unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature have
the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile,
or offensive working environment.330
Sexual harassment was also addressed by Justice Cleckley in Conradv.
33'
Szabo:
ARA
An employer's liability in a case where the source of the sexual
harassment does not include management personnel depends on its
knowledge of the offending conduct, the effectiveness of its
remedial procedures, and the adequacy of its response. An
employer with effective guidelines for prohibiting and dealing with
sexual harassment is not liable unless the employer had knowledge
of the misconduct or reason to know of the misconduct. 32
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Justice Cleckley outlined the manner of proving an employer's knowledge of
unlawful conduct. Cleckley stated, "[k]nowledge of work place misconduct may
be imputed to an employer by circumstantial evidence if the conduct is shown to be
sufficiently pervasive or repetitive so that a reasonable employer, intent on
complying with the West Virginia Human Rights Act, would be aware of the
'
conduct."333
E.

Employee Defined to Include a Supervisor

The opinion in Hanlon v. Chambers334 clarified the meaning of employee
under the state's human rights laws. Justice Cleckley ruled that "[a] supervisor is
an employee under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code 5-11-3(e)
(1992), at least where the individual is not a partner, owner, or part-owner. 3 35 The
opinion further held that
[a] supervisory employee can state a claim for relief against an
employer on the basis of a hostile work environment created by
one or more subordinate employees if the employer knew or should
have known about the offending conduct, yet failed to take swift
and effective measures reasonably calculated to end the
harassment.33 6
F.

Instructingthe Jury

The decision in Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc.337 provides guidelines for
trial courts when giving jury instructions in civil rights cases:
In instructing the jury in civil rights cases, a trial court should bear
in mind -thatthe jury's role is the recreation of what happened and
should strive to charge it in ways that are meaningful and lucid. In
disparate treatment cases under the West Virginia Human Rights
Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9 (1992), the charge should inform the
333
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jury that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the alleged forbidden bias was
a motivating factor in the defendant's decision to take an adverse
employment action against the plaintiff. If the plaintiff carries that
burden, then the jury should find for the plaintiff unless the
defendant can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motive. In making its determination on both intent
and causation, the jury should take into account any inferences
created by the plaintiffs membership in the protected class, his or
her qualifications, the defendant's explanation, the believability of
that explanation, and all other relevant evidence bearing on the
issues."'
In Barlow v. Hester Industries, Inc., 339 Justice Cleckley cautioned trial
courts to provide a limiting jury instruction when admitting certain evidence in
employment discrimination cases:
In an employment discrimination case when an employer
discovers, after terminating an employee, evidence of the
employee's wrongdoing that he or she committed before his or her
discharge, a trial court may, with the exercise of reasonable
discretion, admit such evidence for the limited purpose of
determining which remedies are properly available to the plaintiff
employee. Consistent with Rule 105 of the West Virginia Rules of
Evidence, the trial court, upon admitting after-acquired evidence
of an employee's wrongdoing, should instruct the jury as to the
limited purpose of the evidence. 40
Barlow also provided guidance for trial courts in the giving of final charge
jury instructions in employment discrimination cases:
Jury instructions in an employment discrimination case should be
written to convey clearly for the lay person the operation of
discrimination and should avoid obscuring the forest of
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discrimination with the trees of the three-step analysis from
McDonnell Douglas Corporationv. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct.
1817, 36 L. Ed.2d 668 (1973), and Barefoot v. Sundale Nursing
Home, 193 W.Va. 475, 457 S.E.2d 152 (1995). Accordingly, the
trial court should either (1) instruct the jury that the plaintiff must
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the alleged
discriminatory animus motivated the defendant's employment
decision and that the defendant would not have made the same
decision in the absence of the discriminatory animus, or (2) frame
the evidence in the context of the McDonnell Douglas!Barefoot
framework in order to focus the attention of the jury on the critical
evidentiary issues of the case and to assist it in determining
whether the plaintiff has proved that the defendant's proffered
explanation for its employment decision was pretextual and
motivated by illegal bias and that the defendant would not have
3 41
made the same decision in the absence of the illegal bias.
G.

Retaliatoty Conduct

In Hanlon v. Chambers,3 42 the court ruled that "W. Va. Code 5-11-9(7)(C)
(1992), prohibits an employer or other person from retaliating against any individual
for expressing opposition to a practice that he or she reasonably and in good faith
'343
believes violates the provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act.
H.

Wage Discrimination

In Martin v. Randolph County Board of Education,3 " the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals recognized a claim of wage disparity based upon
unlawful discrimination:
A plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of intentional salary
discrimination if she proves that she is a member of a protected
class and that she receives a lower salary than an individual who
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is not a member of the plaintiff's class and who is similarly
situated to the plaintiff in terms of experience and the
comparability of job content. The employer may rebut the
inference by coming forward with some legitimate explanation for
the salary discrepancy. 45
The opinion also noted that "[a] nonsensical and arbitrary justification for disparate
treatment seriously undercuts an employer's claim that it did not rely on a forbidden
motive and tends to show that the purported justification was pretextual. Still, it is
possible for an employer to act arbitrarily, but not necessarily on the basis of an
illicit motive. 346
The final issue Martin addressed was the issue of the timely filing of a
complaint alleging wage disparity based upon unlawful discrimination:
Unlawful employment discrimination in the form of compensation
disparity based upon a prohibited factor such as race, gender,
national origin, etc., is a 'continuing violation,' so that there is a
present violation of the antidiscrimination statute for as long as
such compensation disparity exists; that is, each paycheck at the
discriminatory rate is a separate link in a chain of violations.
Therefore, a disparate-treatment employment discrimination
complaint based upon allegedly unlawful compensation disparity
is timely brought if it is filed within the statutory limitation period
3 47
after such compensation disparity last occurred.
I.

HandicapEmployment Discrimination

The case of Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Co., Inc.3 48 allowed Justice Cleckley
to address the rights of employees with disabilities. The opinion specifically
focused upon reasonable accommodation for disabled employees:
Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9
(1992), once an employee requests reasonable accommodation, an
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employer must assess the extent of an employee's disability and
how it can be accommodated. If the employee cannot be
accommodated in his or her current position, however it is
restructured, then the employer must inform the employee of
potential job opportunities within the company and, if requested,
consider transferring the employee to fill the open position. To the
extent that Coffinan v. West VirginiaBoardoflRegents, 182 W.Va.
73, 386 S.E.2d 1 (1988), is inconsistent with the foregoing, it is
expressly overruled.34 9
The opinion then tempered the meaning of reasonable accommodation for
employees with disabilities:
Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9
(1992),
reasonable
accommodation
means reasonable
modifications or adjustments to be determined on a case-by-case
basis which are designed as attempts to enable an individual with
a disability to be hired or to remain in the position for which he or
she was hired. The Human Rights Act does not necessarily require
an employer to offer the precise accommodation an employee
requests, at least so long as the employer offers some other
accommodation that permits the employee to fully perform the
job's essential functions. 50
Skaggs next outlined the elements of a cause of action when an employer
failed to provide reasonable accommodation to a disabled employee:
To state a claim for breach of the duty of reasonable
accommodation under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W.
Va. Code, 5- 11-9 (1992), a plaintiff must allege the following
elements: (1) The plaintiff is a qualified person with a disability;
(2) the employer was aware of the plaintiffs disability; (3) the
plaintiff required an accommodation in order to perform the
essential functions of a job; (4) a reasonable accommodation
existed that met the plaintiffs needs; (5) the employer knew or
should have known of the plaintiffs need and of the
accommodation; and (6) the employer failed to provide the

349
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accommodation. 5'
Finally, Skaggs indicated the type of defense an employer may present in
defending against a claim of failing to provide reasonable accommodations for a
disabled employee:
Under the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code, 5-11-9
(1992), in a disparate treatment discrimination case involving an
employee with a disability, an employer may defend against a
claim of reasonable accommodation by disputing any of the
essential elements of the employee's claim or by proving that
making the accommodation imposes an undue hardship on the
employer. Undue hardship is an affirmative defense, upon which
the employer bears the burden of persuasion. 52
J..

Cause of-Action Under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983

353 Justice Cleckley addressed
In Hutchison v. City of Huntington,
a cause
of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the deprivation of rights under the color of
law. The opinion held that "[t]he circuit courts of West Virginia, being courts of
general jurisdiction, have original jurisdiction to hear and resolve claims under Title
42, U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1979). '3u It was then held that:

Because Title 42, U.S.C.A. § 1983 (1979) does not create
substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for pre-existing
rights, all claims under this section must allege a specific violation
of the constitution or "laws" of the United States. In order to
recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that (1) the
conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under
color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person
of rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States. 5
351
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Justice Cleckley sought to extend the protections of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by
attaching similar protections on state constitutional grounds. The opinion did this
by holding that
[u]nless barred by one of the recognized statutory, constitutional
or common law immunities, a private cause of action exists where
a municipality or local governmental unit causes injury by denying
that person rights that are protected by the Due Process Clause
embodied within Article 3, § 10 of the West Virginia
Constitution. 6
XIV. LABOR LAW
The case of Williams v. PrecisionCoil,lnc3 57 examined whether employers
could provide employees with handbooks that had disclaimers. Justice Cleckley
held that "[flor a disclaimer to be valid, it must be sufficiently clear, conspicuous,
and understandable so that employees will know that the handbook provides them
with no protection and it only is intended to benefit one side of the employment
relationship, i.e., the employer. 358
XV. TORT LAW
A.

Statute of Limitations

In Donley v. Bracken,359 the cause of action limitation for incompetents
found in W. Va. Code section 55-2-15 was construed. Donley held "[ijn order for
a permanently incompetent person to maintain a viable and timely action under W.
Va. Code, 55-2-15 (1923), the lawsuit must be brought within twenty years of the
date of the wrongful act and the injury. ' The opinion also determined that "[t]he
twenty year cap in W. Va. Code, 55-2-15 (1923), is reasonably related to the
legislative goal of preventing stale law suits and the failure to impose a similar cap
on competent persons does not adversely discriminate against the mentally
356
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